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ABSTRACT
In this study I examine the creation at the Philadelphia Convention of the
Electoral College for the election of the President of the United States. I then examine the
debate on the constitutional provisions regulating the election o f the United States
president and vice-president during the process of ratification o f the United States
Constitution. I finally examine the actual operation of that electoral system in the first
federal election.
I draw on a body of published primary sources that includes primarily the records
of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the records of the debates in the several state
conventions on the adoption of the United States Constitution, particularly with regard to
the years 1787-1788, and the records of the first federal election of 1788-1790.
This subject matter provides valuable information for further understanding the
political culture of the Revolutionary period. In particular, my argument is that the
creation of the Electoral College and its operation in the first federal election reveal the
remarkable degree to which partisanship was involved in the process of selecting George
Washington and John Adams as, respectively, the first president and the first vicepresident of the United States. I put my interpretation within the context of the relevant
historiography on the subject.

THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The Creation o f the Electoral College through the First Federal Elections

INTRODUCTION

The Electoral College was one o f the ingenious creations that came out of the
Philadelphia Convention, and has been a controversial peculiarity o f American
constitutionalism ever since. After the 2000 election many American voters realized for
the first time how complicated its machinery is. They also realized that it is not a purely
democratic electoral system which every four years establishes who will dwell in the
White House, but one that reflects the federal character of the United States government.
They understood that with their vote they had actually elected electors o f the president,
and not the president himself. And they found that the electors they had entrusted could
overthrow their vote and give it to a candidate different from the one they favored, even
if this is a more theoretical than real possibility, which until now has occurred only rarely
in American history.
Over the years many have criticized this electoral scheme, which has provoked
the highest number of amendments introduced in Congress for a single constitutional
provision. But, with the exception o f the twelfth amendment, which introduced the single
electoral ticket for both the president and the vice-president, and the twenty-second
amendment, which limited the president’s tenure in office to two consecutive terms, all
the reforms proposed have been defeated. The changes the state legislatures have
provided for choosing the presidential electors and the development of the two-party
system, o f which the introduction of the twelfth amendment was a consequence, have
2
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stressed the federal character of the presidential election and have made it virtually direct.
Yet its original design is in many respects unaltered and continues to be the object of
political controversies.
It is indeed a sign of the complexity of executive power that the problem of the
presidential election was also hotly debated at the Philadelphia Convention, by the very
statesmen who conceived the mechanism of the Electoral College. The framers discussed
the mode of election for the president on twenty-one different days and voted on it over
thirty times during the proceedings of the Convention. Several schemes of congressional,
direct, and indirect popular election were put forward. The final draft o f the Electoral
College was proposed by the Committee on Unfinished Parts only on September the 4th
th

and approved, after the introduction of minor amendments, on the 7 , three and a half
months after the Convention had opened and ten days before the delegates signed the
Constitution and submitted it to the states for approval.1
The whole problem of defining the position of the president in the constitutional
framework was one of the most difficult and dividing issues the framers confronted. To
begin with, the idea of an elective national magistrate vested with executive power was in
many respects a novelty. When the American Revolution broke out, no recent nor
significant historical precedent stood as an example for the rebels who were building new
republican governments in the former British colonies. They had to look back to ancient
Greece and Rome, whose greatness no modem republic had been able to match. Tme,

1 According to Shlomo Slonim, “no other constitutional provision gave [the framers] so much difficulty in
its formulation.” Shlomo Slonim, “The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc
Congress for the Selection of a President,” Journal o f American History 73 (1986), p. 35.
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they drew on the rich tradition of European constitutional thought as well as the works of
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Republican thinkers. John Locke and Montesquieu,
who had advocated the separation of powers between the branches o f government, and
the political as well as practical necessity of an independent executive power, were
already well known in America. In his Second Treatise o f Government, Locke wrote:
“The good o f the society requires that several things should be left to the discretion of
him that has the executive power... For the legislators not being able to foresee and
provide by laws for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws,
having the power in his hands, has by the common law of Nature a right to make use of it
for the good o f the society.” But Locke, as did Montesquieu, was referring to a hereditary
monarch, namely the English “King in Parliament,” as he would be conceived after the
Glorious Revolution o f 1688. When both Locke and Montesquieu theorized the
separation of powers, they were also defending the prerogative of the crown. And if as
early as 1656 James Harrington had put forward the idea of an elective executive in The
Commonwealth o f Oceana, such an idea remained the peculiarity of largely unheard
republican theorists. A century later in his influential Commentaries on the Laws o f
England, the English jurist William Blackstone discarded it because it would result in
“periodical bloodshed and misery.”
In fact, while drafting their new constitutions, the American revolutionaries most
of all reacted to the stubborn authoritarianism of George III, so vehemently condemned

2 John Locke, Two Treatises o f Government (New York, Mentor Books, 1965), 159; William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws o f England: A Facsimile o f the First Edition o f 1765-1769. 4 vols. (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 1:186.

5

by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. This antimonarchical stance,
with its implied opposition to regal prerogative, resulted in a fundamental rebuttal o f the
separation of powers. In the newborn state republics the governors were made directly
dependent on the legislatures, and stripped of the major powers that they had enjoyed in
the colonies as the agent of the English crown. Under the Articles of Confederation the
president was also dependent on the legislature and merely presided over Congress.
The years following the outbreak of the Revolution witnessed rapid developments
in politics, of which the democratization of the state legislatures and the increasing
inadequacy of the Confederation were major cases. The Philadelphia Convention was
conceived o f as a means to confront such developments, and to the advocates of political
consolidation the empowerment of the executive, which had already been attempted in
New York and Massachusetts with the introduction of the constitutions of 1777 and 1780,
and had been proposed in the Continental Congress by superintendent of finance Robert
Morris, was instrumental to a design aimed at restraining the rising populism of
American politics and the ineffectiveness of the Confederation. Confronting what they
now considered the perils of unchecked legislative assemblies and increasingly factious
political majorities, the framers thus reinterpreted the principle of the separation of
powers. But the definition of the executive power, particularly a national executive within
a new continental government, was by no means easy. As late as April 16, 1787, only a

3 As Jack Rakove noted, “the evisceration of the executive power was the most conspicuous aspect of the
early state constitutions.” Jack Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making o f the
Constitution (New York, Knopf, 1996), 250. A broad treatment of this aspect of Revolutionary politics and
its theoretical assumptions is in Gordon S. Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 1969), particularly chapters IV-VI.
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month before the opening of the convention, James Madison wrote to George
Washington and confessed his difficulty in conceiving the very nature of a national
executive: “I have scarcely ventured as yet to form my own personal opinion either of the
matter in which he ought to be constituted or of the authorities with which he ought to be
cloathed.” His difficulty would be that o f many at Philadelphia, where the lack of
consistent historical precedents, the persistence of the antimonarchical stance, and the
disagreement between the delegates over the nature of the future national government,
made the definition of the executive particularly challenging. “[T]o unite a proper energy
in the Executive and a proper stability in the Legislature departments,” as Madison
explained to Jefferson after the convention, was “peculiarly embarrassing.”4
The choice of the mode of election of the president was part of the framers’ effort
to create the presidency. As such, it was interconnected with other important issues, since
it would affect the representativeness, the independence, and therefore the authority of
the executive within the national government. The election of the president by the
legislature would result in his dependence on it, weakening his appeal among the people,
and undermining the separation of powers many favored. Depending on the nature of
representation in Congress, such mode o f election would prove palatable either to the
states with large electorates or to those with small ones. Had Congress been elected by
the people at large, Congressional election would be favored by the states with large

4 Madison to Washington, in William T. Hutchinson, ed., The Papers o f James Madison, 17 vols.
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1962-1991), 9: 385. Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787,
Papers, 10:207-208. According to Marton J. Frish, “at the time of the Constitutional Convention virtually
none of the delegates, with the exception of Alexander Hamilton, Gouvemeur Morris and James Wilson,
were cognizant of a role for executive power in a republican government beyond that of law enforcement
and administration.” Marton J. Frish, “Executive Power and Republican Government - 1787,” Presidential
Studies Quarterly 17, Spring 1987, p. 281.
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electorates, while it would be opposed by the states with small electorates, because the
former would be, in terms of numbers, more influential in the choice of the president. On
the other hand, if Congress were to represent the states, as it was under the Articles of
Confederation, Congressional election would be supported by the states with small
electorates, because this way electoral size would not matter and each state would be
granted an equal share in the presidential election. Popular election would save the
separation of powers and create an independent executive with greater authority and
national character as one powerful unifying symbol for the newborn nation. Indirect
popular election would meet the expectations of those who, given the size of the nation
and the increase of factions and partisanship, were concerned about the practical as well
as political feasibility of direct popular election. Finally, two other issues further
complicated the matter: terms of office and eligibility for reelection. Depending on their
mix, the president would be held more or less accountable, whether by the legislature or
the people.
The Electoral College provided what the framers considered a viable middle
ground for the solution o f all these issues. Yet, their virtually unanimous satisfaction with
the original mechanism they had devised was not always matched by an equally positive
appraisal from those who were asked to ratify the new constitution. Furthermore, from
the first federal elections, the Electoral College only partially worked as the framers had
claimed it would, particularly with regard to the election of the vice-president, who was
also chosen through the Electoral College. What the framers failed to envision was the
remarkable influence exerted by rapidly developing national parties. These proved
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pivotal in determining the actual operation of the first Electoral College, and their
existence defeated the main purpose of indirect elections, that of keeping the selection of
both the president and the vice-president out of the reach of political factions.
The records of the Philadelphia Convention provide ample evidence with regard
to the issues that were at stake in the framing of the presidential election as well as the
difficulty the framers confronted while conceiving of the Electoral College. The first part
o f this thesis, which covers the proceedings of the convention, is mainly based on those
records. The debate during the ratification of the Constitution in the several states and the
first federal election, the regulation and the proceedings of that election, and private
correspondences from the period provide further evidence with regarding to the framers’
intentions as well as the reception o f their ideas in the political environment of the time.
The latter set of documents constitute the foundation for the second part of this study.5

5 The great body of primary sources for the proceeding of the Philadelphia Convention, the debates on the
ratification of the Constitution, and the first federal elections are reprinted in respectively Max Farrand, ed.,
The Records o f the Federal Convention o f 1787. A vols. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1911); Merrill
Jensen et al., eds., The Documentary History o f the Ratification of the Constitution. 19 vols. (Madison:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-); and Merrill Jensen et al., eds., The Documentary History of
the First Federal Elections, 1788-1790. 4 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976). In this
study I also rely on Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption o f
the Federal Constitution (Salem, N.H.: Ayer, 1987), and on Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete AntiFederalist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). From now on, those collections of primary
sources will be abbreviated as respectively RFC, DHRC, DHFFE, DSSC, and CAF.

CHAPTER I
THE FRAMING OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

The first scheme of election of the national executive discussed at Philadelphia
was that outlined in the Virginia Plan, the proposal for national consolidation drafted by
Virginia’s delegates and presented by Governor Edmund Randolph on May 29, 1787,
four days after the opening of the Convention. The Virginia Plan provided for a national
executive “to be chosen by a National Legislature,” and “to be ineligible a second time.”
The executive was to join the judiciary in a council of revision. The office was also to
enjoy a limited veto. The number of magistrates who would compose the executive and
the length of the term of office were not specified. On June 1 the Convention begun to
debate the scheme, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania soon stood out as a major
advocate for a strong executive. W ilson’s first struggle was that for a single office, which
alone, he contended, would provide it with the necessary “energy, dispatch and
responsibility.” His proposal was aimed to achieve further consolidation, but it met the
immediate opposition of Randolph, who regarded a unitary executive as “the foetus of
monarchy.” Madison favored it, but only if it would be “aided by a council, who should
have the right to advise and record their proceedings, but not to control his authority.”
Roger Sherman of Connecticut simply “wished the number might not be fixed.” He
maintained that the legislature “should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience
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might dictate.” 1
Randolph well embodied the antimonarchical stance at the Convention, while also
expressing the concerns of those who opposed excessive consolidation. By the same
token, Sherman envisioned a weak executive in the hands of the legislature, as governors
were in most of the states. Madison, in contrast, endorsed the idea of concentrating the
authority of the executive on a single person, but he still felt obliged to maintain the
provision of a council. This arrangement resembled the balance of powers in the state
governments, where, with the sole exception of Pennsylvania, the executive was unitary
and a council directly elected by the people advised and checked the governor. The idea
of a vigorous and independent executive was still far from winning the support of the
•

•

•

■

•

majority of the delegates, including Madison, the great architect of the Convention.

2

Despite such resistance, the following day, June 2, Wilson took a further step.
This time he outlined the first scheme of indirect popular election presented at the
Convention, providing that the states would be “divided into Districts,” and that “the
persons, qualified to vote in each District,” would “elect Members for their respective
Districts to be electors of the Executive Magistracy.” A similar Electoral College had
been introduced in Maryland in 1776, and proposed, though unsuccessfully, at the New
York constitutional convention of 1777. Drafted by the wealthiest and most prominent
leaders of the colony and not submitted to the people, the Maryland Constitution

1 RFC 1:21,65-7.
2 With the constitution of 1776, Pennsylvania had replaced the governor with an Executive Council of
twelve, who were elected directly by the people. In the other states the executive office was also weakened
by the introduction of state councils. According to Gordon Wood, state councils “greatly diluted the
independence of governors’ authority, making them... little more than chairman o f their executive boards.”
Wood, Creation, 137.
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provided that fifteen senators were chosen by forty electors, selected by the voters of the
county in which they lived. Two electors were selected from each county, and the Cities
of Annapolis and Baltimore were entitled to one each.
Letters exchanged between Edmund Pendleton and Thomas Jefferson after the
introduction of Virginia’s Constitution show two points o f view on the matter, one
political, and the other practical, which many shared at Philadelphia. While admitting that
his arguments would be “disagreeable to the people,” Pendleton wrote on August 10,
1776, that he would not object to the election of the senators by the people, had they been
given life term and “been chosen out of the people of great property,” that is, with “fixed
Permanent property.” Jefferson agreed since he had already suggested the election of the
upper house by the lower house, arguing: “A choice by the people themselves is not
generally distinguished for its wisdom. This first secretion from them is usually crude and
heterogeneous. But give to those so chosen by the people a second choice by themselves,
and they generally will chuse wise men.” Similarly the case of the Electoral College in
Maryland was in Madison’s eyes one of the best alternatives to an election of the
executive by the legislature. One year after the closing o f the Convention, in his
observations on Jefferson’s draft of a constitution for Virginia, he wrote: “An election by
the Legislature is liable to insuperable objections. It not only tends to faction intrigue and
corruption, but leaves the Executive under the influence o f an improper obligation to that
department. An election by the people at large, as in this and several other States - or by

3 RFC 1:77-78. According to Jackson Turner Main, this was the fulfillment of antidemocratic theories that
many elite revolutionaries shared, but that were successful only in Maryland, where the upper class proved
“sufficiently determined and powerful to create a truly aristocratic Senate.” Jackson Turner Main, The
Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763-1788 (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 204.
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Electors as in the appointment of the Senate in Maryland, or indeed by the people through
any other channel than their legislative representatives, seem to be far preferable.”4
Though the Electoral College per se did not meet any particular criticism when
Wilson first proposed it on June 2, the attempt to strengthen the executive, by making it
independent of the legislature, received scarce support. Instead, the Convention passed a
resolution submitted by Randolph, which provided for an executive “to be chosen by the
national legislature for the term of seven years,” and “to be ineligible a second time.” O f
this initial balance between mode o f election, terms of office, and eligibility for
reelection, the seven-year term was the only aspect meant to grant a certain degree of
autonomy to the executive. The Committee of the Whole confirmed Randolph’ provision,
while also rejecting Delaware delegate John Dickinson’s proposal o f an executive
“removeable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority o f the Legislatures
of individual States,” a check on the national legislature which, on the other hand, would
make the executive dependent on the states. However, despite the theatrical opposition of
Randolph, “which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived,” and at least
eleven other delegates who favored a plural executive, on June 4 the Committee approved
Wilson’s provision for a unitary executive, hence laying the basis upon which the
empowerment of the office would be grounded.5
On June 15 William Patterson o f New Jersey submitted the New Jersey Plan,

4 Pendleton and Jefferson quoted in Main, Upper House, 204; Papers, 11:289.
5 RFC 1:85, 88. According to C. Herman Pritchett, “the unitary nature [was] the foundation on which the
entire subsequent development of the Executive Office [rested].” C. Herman Pritchett, The Presidential
Constitutional Position, in Thomas E. Cronin, ed., Rethinking the Presidency (Boston-Toronto, Little,
Brown and Company, 1982), 122.
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which called for a “Federal Executive,” to be elected by “the U. States in Congress,” and
to be “ineligible a second time, and removeable by Congress on application by a majority
of the Executives of the several States.” The composition and the term of the office,
which in the amended Virginia Plan constituted the strength of the executive, were not
specified. Under the provisions of the New Jersey Plan, which involved only a partial
reformation of the Articles of Confederation, the executive once again enjoyed little
independence - like in Dickinson’s proposal it depended on the states - and therefore
modest power. Against such a drawback Alexander Hamilton of New York raised his
voice in his lengthy speech of June 18. Unmistakably rejecting the New Jersey Plan, but
also substantially revising the Virginia Plan, he plainly called for a “general and national
government, completely sovereign.” His plan arranged for a senate “to be elected by
electors to be chosen for that purpose by the people, and to remain in office during life,”
and provided that “all state laws” would be “absolutely void,” if they contravene those
passed by the national legislature. As such, it aimed not only at the consolidation of the
national government, but also at altering the balance of powers as it had evolved in most
of the states. The strengthening of the executive, who would have the power, among
others, “of negativing all laws,” and would be in office “during life,” was an essential
aspect of this design. Like Wilson, Hamilton proposed that electors would be “appointed
in each of the states to elect the executive.”6
While discussing the composition of the executive under the Virginia Plan,
Sherman had said that he considered the Executive magistracy “as nothing more than an

6 RFC 1:244, 300.
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institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect,” and that “the person or
persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the
depositary of the supreme will of the Society.” His concept of the executive magistrate
still resembled that which inspired the framers of state constitutions in 1776. For
example, Jefferson in his 1776 draft for the Virginia Constitution conceived of a governor
who had no voice in legislation, no authority in international relations, no authority to
pardon crimes, and restricted power of appointment. Though the Virginia Constitution
actually granted the governor greater powers, Jefferson mainly conceived of him as an
“Administrator.”7
Cognizant of the weakness of the national executive in the Confederation,
Hamilton held a completely different notion of its position in the constitutional
framework. “Let one executive be appointed who dares execute his powers,” he urged his
fellow delegates. He thus recognized the key role o f the chief executive as a military
leader and his broad responsibility in administration. He also acknowledged the
executive’s function in unifying contrasting political views within the legislature as well
as opposing sectionalism and what he considered shortsighted grievances, such as those
from debtors and paper money champions, which were seen not only as economically
detrimental but as a threat to the established social order. After all, he maintained that “all
communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well
bom, the other the mass of the people.” As he would later explain in The Federalist,
Hamilton believed that “energy in the Executive [was] a leading character in the

7 RFC 1:300. Jefferson quoted in Wood, Creation, 137.
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definition o f good government,” and that “a vigorous Executive” was “essential to the
protection of the community against foreign attacks... the steady administration o f the
law s... the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice... the security o f liberty against
the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.”

o

Hamilton presented his proposals as amendments to the Virginia Plan, but the
Convention never debated them. Uttered in an assembly where conservative statements
were not rare, his speech was appreciated, but it was probably deemed impractical. A few
days after Hamilton had intervened, William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut noted that
the “gentleman from New York” had “been praised by every body,” but had “been
supported by none.” And yet, even though the overall nationalistic and antidemocratic
logic of his plan was substantially discarded, Hamilton’s proposals for the empowerment
of the executive would eventually be influential. In the end the Convention would give
the executive the power of “negativing all laws” passed by the legislature, even though
two-thirds of the legislature could then void the presidential veto. The executive could
also make treaties and appoint ambassadors and judges o f the Supreme Court with the
consent of the Senate, and act as “the sole direction of all military operations,” as
Hamilton had recommended. Finally, the idea of an indirect presidential election
eventually appeared in the proposal for the introduction of the Electoral College, which

8 RFC 1:65, 299. Publius, “The Federalist LXX,” New York Independent Journal, March 15, 1788, in
DHRC, 16:396. In his exhortation to “[l]et one executive be appointed who dares execute his powers,”
Hamilton was touching upon what Harvey C. Mansfield has defined as “the ambivalence of the executive
power,” that is, its peculiarity of being “both subordinate and not subordinate, both weak and strong.”
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence o f Modern Executive Power (New York,
The Free Press, 1989), xvi.
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Hamilton actively supported when, after a long absence, he came back to Philadelphia
toward the end of the Convention, and later, as “Publius,” in the struggle for the
ratification of the Constitution. The thrust o f Hamilton’s view was in its national
perspective: a strong union needed a strong executive.9
In the four weeks between Hamilton’s speech and the adoption, on July 16, of the
Connecticut Compromise, the issue of presidential selection was in practice set aside. It
came up again only once the former supporters of the Virginia and the New Jersey plans
had reached a basic agreement on the crucial subject of representation in the national
legislature. At this point, Randolph’s provision still ruled: with the Connecticut
Compromise, the delegates had agreed that the president was to be elected by the
legislature, to serve for seven years, and to be ineligible for a second term. This
settlement did not last long, and the issue of the mode of electing the executive once
again arose, in increasingly Hamiltonian terms. Once almost everyone had finally
accepted the idea of the unitary executive, the necessity of an adjustment in the balance
of powers in favor of the executive became apparent. From July 17 to July 26, several
schemes were put forward, all somehow aimed at rendering the chief executive, now
widely called “the president,” more independent of the legislature. As a result, the
Convention turned its attention back to popular election, and the interconnected problems
o f eligibility and terms of office.
This time the discussion went into greater depth, with the delegates’ expressing

9 RFC 1: 300, 363. As Broadus Mitchell put it, a number of Hamilton’s proposals, “percolated through the
discussions in the succeeding three months and won their way into the Constitution.” This was particularly
true with respect to the executive power. Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton: Youth to Maturity, 17551788 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), 392.
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practical as well as political considerations of the feasibility of an election by the people.
However the independence o f the executive was not the only issue at stake. Now that
representation in both houses had been defined, the delegates had clearer ideas about
whom the president should represent, and conceived different modes of election to give
more power to the states, or to the people. The delegates who favored popular election
were primarily from the states with larger electorates, notably Pennsylvanians Morris and
Wilson. Those who opposed popular election were from the states with smaller
electorates, whether because of their size, or because they had large slave populations
that would not be influential in the selection of the president. The Connecticut
Compromise had solved the issue of representation in the national legislature. As a result,
in this crucial second round of discussion, the idea of a scheme of presidential election
that would reflect the balance of representation in the legislature finally appeared. Some
of the proposals now presented actually anticipated the compromise that would be
eventually reached with the introduction of the Electoral College.
Popular election was the first scheme debated. On July 17 Gouvemeur Morris,
another delegate from Pennsylvania, advocated an energetic executive, which was not
impeachable, was provided with ample powers of appointment, was elected by the
people, and was re-eligible. In particular, Morris made so strong a case against
ineligibility - he contended that it “tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior,
the hope o f being rewarded by a re-appointment” - that the clause was immediately
removed from the text on which the Convention so far had agreed. But the acceptance of
Morris’s argument implied the rejection of legislative election - which he compared to
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“the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals” - because re-eligibility alone would
put the president in the hands of the legislature. To reestablish the independence of the
executive, proposals were thus made for letting him remain in office “during good
behavior.” But that was going too far, because no definite term limits meant not enough
check on the executive, and the Convention rejected both proposals. And yet, once re
eligibility had passed, popular election seemed indeed to be the only way to make the
executive independent of the legislature. It was then reconsidered, two days later, when
Morris called for an executive magistrate who should be “the guardian of the people,”
against “Legislative tyranny.”10
At this point of the proceedings, two issues arose in the discussion. Those issues
were distinct, but they both brought the delegates to the same conclusion and paved the
way for the final scheme: indirect election, whether it involved the participation of the
people, or not. On the one hand, many were concerned that popular election would be
practically impossible and politically dangerous for their republican design. Rufus King
and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts were among those. Representing a populous state
where the people already elected the governor, they had reasons to both support and
oppose it. They were not prejudicially against a popular election in which their state
would have the lion share, but their own experience with democratic politics warned
them against the perils that, in their eyes, popular election entailed. King assured his
colleagues that he was “much disposed to think that in [a national presidential election]
the people at large would chuse wisely,” but he also saw “some difficulty arising from the

10 RFC 2:33, 52.
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improbability of a general concurrence o f the people in favor of any one man.” The
difficulties King was referring to were practical: in the absence of well-structured
national parties and a modem press, whose rapid development starting from the 1790s
none of the framers fully anticipated, it was indeed difficult that one single candidate
would reach the majority. Like Wilson and Hamilton had done before him, King
proposed that “electors chosen by the people for the purpose” would elect the president.
To him, indirect election apparently was a way to create an electorate which would be
most likely to cast a useful vote for a national candidate to the presidency.11
In a political environment in which, despite rising democratization, deference still
regulated personal relations to a great extent, and enfranchisement was limited to around
one sixth o f the population, King apparently expected that voters would select
presidential electors out o f informed people, whether because of their higher social
statues or their involvement in politics. But, of course, indirect election was not only a
practical device to ensure that the result of presidential elections would be clear. It was
also meant to keep the great mass of voters from directly electing the highest magistrate
of the republic. Govemeur Morris advocated a presidential election “by the freeholders of
the Country.” He admitted that “difficulties attend this mode,” but he also added that
“they have been found superable in New York &. in Connecticut and w ould... be found
so, in the case of an Executive for the United States.” Perhaps because, like many others
at the Convention, he too relied on Washington’s fame, Morris was optimist about the
feasibility of popular election. “If the people should elect,” he predicted, “they will never

11 RFC 2:55-56.
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fail to prefer some man o f distinguished character, or services; some man, if he might so
speak, of continental reputation.” Gerry, who spoke little after King, made clear that there
were also critical political issues at stake.12
Gerry discarded popular election all together, even in the form of indirect election
proposed by King. “The popular mode of electing the chief Magistrate would certainly be
the worst of all,” he unambiguously stated. He made clear that he feared the appeal of
demagogues on the voters, who, he maintained, were “uninformed” and would be
“misled by a few designing men.” To support his position he had convincing reasons that
went back to Shays’s Rebellion of the year before, and the role the governor of
Massachusetts and the president of New Hampshire had played in suppressing it. Both
the governor and the president had not been reelected in their states in 1787, and now
Gerry warned the Convention against the popular election of the national executive: “If
he should be so elected and should do his duty, he will be turned out for it like Governor
Bowdom in Massachusetts and President Sullivan in New Hampshire.”

1^

It was remarkable that two delegates from a state that, in terms of representation,
would have been favored by popular election nevertheless opposed it, to the point that
one of them had proposed a presidential election by the state executives. It was less
surprising that the delegates from small states as well as those from the Southern states,
where approximately one third of the population were disenfranchised slaves, were
dissatisfied with popular election and favored indirect election. Patterson of New Jersey
made the case for the small states, when he said that his ideas “nearly coincided” with

12 RFC, 2:29.
13 RFC 2:57.
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those of King, and then proposed that the president should be appointed “by Electors to
be chosen by the States in a ratio that would allow one elector to the smallest and three to
the largest States.” Madison, who spoke shortly after Patterson, made what would
eventually result as the decisive point for the provision of electors.14
A fine student of constitutionalism, but also a delegate from a slave state and a
slaveholder himself, Madison praised the virtues of popular election - apparently during
the discussion nobody but Gerry explicitly rejected it - while at the same time indicating
its risks, particularly with regard to the imbalance in representation between the states.
Madison was still concerned that popular elections would excessively suffer from
localism. “The people at large” were, in his opinion, “as likely as any that could be
devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character,” but they
“generally could only know and vote for some Citizen whose merits had rendered him an
object of general attention and esteem.” However Madison also noticed another problem
with popular election, one “of a serious nature”. “The right of suffrage was much more
diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States,” he maintained, “and the latter could
have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes.” On the other hand, he
found that indirect election through electors “obviated this difficulty and seemed on the
whole to be liable to the fewest objections.” 15
Gerry followed Madison’s lead and put forward his plan o f indirect election. As a

14 RFC 2:56.
15 RFC 2:56-57. That slavery greatly mattered in the creation of the Electoral College is one of the
arguments of Paul Finkelman in “Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant with
Death,” in Richard Beeman and Stephen Botein, eds., Beyond Confederation: Origins o f the Constitution
and American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1987), chapter VII.
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part of a complicated frame of government he had conceived, he proposed that the
executive would be appointed “by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives.” The
Convention did not even discuss Gerry’s plan, and he soon backed another plan of
indirect election, this time by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut. Ellsworth proposed that
the executive should be chosen by electors “appointed by the Legislatures of the States,”
whose number would be apportioned in the following ratio: “one for each State not
exceeding 100,000 inhabitants, two for each above 100,000 and not exceeding 300,000,
and, three for each State exceeding 300,000.” Ellsworth’s scheme was not as palatable to
some states as the Connecticut Compromise had been. A crucial state in supporting the
consolidation of the national government, Virginia would not see its slaves counted, as
they were under the three-fifth clause. Having a free population o f c. 450,000, it would be
as represented as would Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York, whose population
ranged from 310,000 to 430,000. But Virginia also had a slave population of almost
300,000 that would go completely unrepresented. By attenuating the principle of
proportional representation, granting the state legislatures the power of choosing the
electors o f the president, while also securing the executive’s independence from the
legislature, Ellsworth’s scheme nevertheless proposed a viable alternative to both
congressional and popular election. As such, it resembled what would be the final scheme
of the Electoral College.16
The Convention approved Ellsworth’s plan, but the time was not ripe for

16 RFC 2:57. Jack Rakove noted that Ellsworth’s scheme “briefly took on the aura of a panacea.” Rakove,
Original Meanings, 259. According to Shlomo Slonim, “now the provision for choosing an executive was,
in certain key features, approaching the ultimate form that would emerge from the convention.” Slonim,
“Electoral College,” 44.
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agreement. Four days later, on July 24, when discussion of the adoption o f electors
resumed, it was soon clear that most delegates were still not convinced. Hugh Williamson
o f North Carolina contended that electors “would certainly not be men of the 1st nor even
of the 2nd grade in the States,” because “these would all prefer a seat in the Legislatures.”
Gerry, backed by King, replied that “the best men” would be honored to be electors, since
“the election of the Executive Magistrate will be considered as of vast importance and
will excite great earnestness.” Williamson’s argument proved convincing while Gerry’s
did not. The Convention thus rejected Ellsworth’s plan and readopted election by the
legislature, now proposed by William Houston of New Jersey. Williamson seconded
Houston’s motion, while Pennsylvania (Wilson and Morris’s state), Massachusetts (King
and Gerry’s), Connecticut and Virginia (Ellsworth and Madison’s) voted against it.

17

Apparently the concept o f indirect popular election through presidential electors
had still not won the approval of enough delegates from slave and small states. And yet,
again, states’ representation was not the only issue at stake. While arguing about the
personal quality of presidential electors, both Williamson and Gerry were in fact
confronting the new problem of political organization in a national republic within the
boundaries o f a political conception that, while rooted in tradition, had nevertheless been
eroded, and would gradually become anachronistic in the following years and decades.
They spoke as if the electors’ honor, that is, their capability of living up to their social
status, or “grade,” would provide the only reliable guarantee that a suitable president
could be elected. True, those who had national interests or were enough aware o f state

17 RFC 2:99-101.
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and continental politics as to raise above a narrow perspective were most likely to come
from the ranks of what was then called the “better sort.” But the electors’ status also
promised that they could be trusted in another way: that, with their choice, they would
not defy the social order some had started questioning during the Revolution.
In a time when deferential habits were still usual and hierarchically organized
mass parties were still to come, the politically problematic popular choice of an
independent national executive was to pass through the filter of indirect election. And
Williamson and Gerry were by no means the only ones that shared such a traditional
conception. As would soon become clear, most of the framers intended indirect election
as something similar to a system of “virtual representation,” of the kind the American
colonists had opposed while revolting against the British Parliament, rather than a
modem system o f political representation. They expected or, rather, they wished the
popular vote to be similar to an act of trust as opposed to a real political mandate.
If those who agreed with Williamson might have still believed that popular
election, even indirect popular election, would be impractical and politically dangerous,
the rejection of Ellsworth’s plan still left the compelling point for an independent
executive unanswered. As the Convention moved on to re-discuss the matter the next
day, Ellsworth presented a second plan o f indirect election. This time he proposed that
the legislature appoint the president but, in case he stood for reelection, “Electors
appointed by the Legislatures of the States for that purpose” would decide whether he
would stay in his office for another term or not. This way, Ellsworth explained, “a
deserving Magistrate may be reelected without making him dependent on the
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Legislature.”18
Gerry, too, presented a new plan of indirect election, which slightly altered the
one he had presented a few days before. Once again he moved that the national executive
would be appointed by the executives of the states, but this time he added: “with advice
of their Councils, and when there are no Councils by Electors chosen by the
Legislatures.” The Convention rejected Ellsworth’ plan and did not even discuss
Gerry’s.19
Ellsworth and Gerry’s proposals may have been awkward attempts to reach a
compromise on a different basis, but they also illustrate how election by the legislature
was repeatedly contrasted at the Convention and how the idea of electors loomed
throughout the proceedings, being presented in several shapes, until it finally passed in
the form of the Electoral College. At this point, however, agreement was still far away.
Madison, indeed, thought that the Convention had definitely discarded the idea of
electors. “This mode however had been rejected so recently and by so great a majority
that it probably would not be proposed anew,” he said. But he also did not see any
alternative to direct popular election. Election by the legislature, he maintained, was
“liable to insuperable objections.” Election by the state legislatures was not politically
practicable, since it stood against the very purpose of the Constitutional Convention
itself. “The Legislatures of the States,” he contended, “had betrayed a strong propensity
to a variety of pernicious measures. One object of the National Legislature was to
controul this propensity. One object of the National Executive, so far as it would have a

18 RFC 2:108-109.
19 RFC 2:109.
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negative on the laws, was to controul the National Legislature, so far as it might be
infected with a similar propensity. Refer the appointment of the National Executive to the
State Legislatures, and this controuling purpose may be defeated.” Madison thus favored
popular election, which “with all its imperfections he liked... best.” There was, of course,
the disadvantage at which it put the slave states and the small states. But for his part, “as
an individual from the Southern States,” he assured them that he was willing “to make the
sacrifice,” conceding that “local considerations must give way to the general interest.”20
There was also another problem Madison saw with popular election. He was not
convinced that voters could overcome their localism, and feared they would give their
vote only to candidates from their own state, hence failing to select a national candidate.
But he was willing to strike a compromise on this. He therefore endorsed Morris’s
proposal that each voter would elect two candidates, one of which would be from a state
different from his own, although he was also concerned that “each Citizen after having
given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen would throw away his second on some
obscure Citizen of another State, in order to ensure the object of his first choice.” Once
applied to presidential electors rather than common voters, Morris’s provision would
eventually become part of the final scheme of election. On July 25 the Convention
rejected it, and on the next day they resumed discussion of congressional election,
ineligibility, and the seven-year term, as originally provided for in Randolph’s proposal
o f June 2 and now reintroduced by George Mason of Virgima.

71

The second round o f debate on the selection o f the president, from July 17 to July

20 RFC, 2:109-111.
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26, had touched all the problems at stake: the independence of the executive; the
relevance of direct and indirect popular vote and of congressional selection in terms of
state representation; and the suitability o f both voters and appointed electors for selecting
the president. The delegates discussed several provisions that would be eventually
considered along with the introduction of the Electoral College: indirect popular election,
non-proportional apportionment o f the electors, and double selection - by either the
people or state elected bodies —of the presidential candidates. They painstakingly tried to
set the right balance between mode of election, term of office, and re-eligibility, but they
were not able to go beyond the scheme they had initially agreed on while discussing the
Virginia Plan.
Later in July the matter went to the Committee of Detail, who had to decide how
the houses would vote for president: if separately or jointly, if casting votes by single
representative and senator or by state. In fact their task was to conceive a system that
could save the independence o f the president while somehow reflecting the balance of
representation that had already been imbedded in the legislature with the Connecticut
Compromise.
On August 6, the Committee o f Detail reported to the Convention that they had
not yet solved the matter. They had agreed on the unitary office - there would be no
further argument on that issue - but they had left Randolph’s provision unchanged,
without specifying the mode o f election by the legislature. That day and the following the
Convention discussed the matter, with no result. It would be taken up again on the 24th,
only to be again postponed. Discussion resumed on the 3 1st, when the Convention finally
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referred the matter to the Committee on Unfinished Parts, which was charged with
resolving all issues that had been postponed or not acted on. That was the last chance to
reach an agreement. On September 4 the Committee on Unfinished Parts reported back to
the Convention, and proposed the adoption of the Electoral College. There are no records
left from the proceedings of the Committee, whose four days of work must have been
intense, because they virtually ended three and a half months of debate on the election of
the national executive. Only minor amendments to the Committee’s provision for
presidential election were added afterwards. The plan submitted was ingenious, as it
provided the answers to many of the questions raised until then. The Committee, presided
over by New Jersey delegate David Brearly, had chosen a system of indirect election that
secured the independence of the president, while reproducing the balance between
popular and state representation guaranteed by the Connecticut Compromise. The system
also met the expectation of those who had warned the Convention against the practical
and political viability of popular election on the national scale, as presidential electors
were more likely than common voters to make an informed choice.
That the Electoral College proved satisfying to state’s righters was a crucial
aspect of the plan for the sake of its reception. Each state would appoint, “in such manner
as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators
and members of the House of Representatives, to which the State may be entitled in the
Legislature.” In terms of representation, the plan constituted an exact reproduction of
Congress. Hence the Electoral College was in line with the Connecticut Compromise,
upon which the delegates had long since agreed. The state legislatures were also at liberty
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to decide upon the mode of election of the presidential electors. Furthermore, in case o f a
tie vote or if no candidate attained a majority, the presidential election would be decided
by a majority vote in the Senate, where each state was equally represented. 22
The idea of a runoff election was not a novelty. It had existed in Massachusetts
for the election of the Senate since 1780, and in a form very similar to the one the framers
adopted. Each county chose its senator, but if no candidate reached the absolute majority,
the lower house would ballot until they filled the undecided seats. It is likely that the
framers expected a presidential runoff election to work in the same way. They probably
assumed that, if no candidates won the majority in the Electoral College, the selection
made by the presidential electors would be considered just as an indication of candidates,
from which the Senate should pick the one they favored.23
Mason predicted that the presidential election would end up in the Senate
“nineteen times in twenty.” Baldwin, Wilson, and Gouvemeur Morris, were more
confident in the choice of the presidential electors. But if a runoff election eventually
took place, it would have probably altered the nature of presidential election. The
provision of a runoff election in the Senate was a safety measure, because it granted that
even a candidate with a plurality in the Electoral College would become a president of
national character, as that individual would be ultimately chosen by at least a majority o f
the states. However a runoff election would make the presidential election a matter of

22 RFC 2:497.
23 According to Main, while selecting the state’s senators Massachusetts’s lower house “felt no obligation
to name the candidate with the highest number of votes, but chose from the first two or three on the list,
depending on the balance of political power.” The framers probably saw the runoff election in Congress
likewise. Of course, if the framers wanted Congress to merely register the result of the Electoral College
and appoint the candidate with a plurality o f the electoral votes, why through a congressional runoff
election? Main, Upper House, 164.
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state power, and would affect the separation and balance of power, because it would
weaken the president’s independence from the Senate, the branch of Congress that would
share with him substantial powers of appointment and the responsibility o f foreign
affairs.24
On the issues of representation and the separation of power was therefore centered
the discussion that opened after the report of Brearly’s Committee. Williamson and
Wilson, both from states - North Carolina and Pennsylvania - that would be influential in
the Electoral College, offered amendments to the provisions for runoff election.
Williamson proposed that the Senate’s choice was restrained at least to the two
candidates with the highest number o f votes. Wilson thought it might be better “to refer
the eventual appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a
smaller number than five of the Candidates.” The day after, September 5, the Convention
was still discussing the problem when Mason, a delegate from Virginia, moved to strike
down the suggestion of a runoff election. Williamson seconded Mason’s motion, which
would have allowed a candidate with a simple plurality in the Electoral College to
become president.

or

It is not easy to understand whether Mason and Williamson’s purpose was to
safeguard the people’s will or to give their states a chance to play a larger role in the
election of the president. Apparently Sherman referred to the latter when he reminded the
opponents of a runoff election that “if the Small States had the advantage in the Senate’s

24 RFC 2:500. On the framers’ prediction about the likelihood of a runoff election in Congress, see the brief
but thoughtful discussion in Slonim, “Electoral College,” 54, n. 44.
25 RFC 2:501.
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deciding among the five highest candidates, the Large States would have in fact the
nomination of these candidates.” On this crucial point the Convention almost
unanimously decided to support the compromise reached in the Brearly’s committee.
Even Wilson opposed Mason’s motion that was rejected by all of the states but
Williamson’s North Carolina. Conversely the next day, September 6, the Convention
substituted the House of Representatives for the Senate, as the branch of Congress that
would select the president in a runoff election. The Convention also ensured that state
power would remain influential, by providing that the House would vote “with Members
0f \

from each State having one vote”.

The provision for state-regulated presidential elections was a further concession to
state’s righters. This provision did not discard popular election all together, but
considerably limited its likelihood, since the state legislatures were free to avoid a risky
popular election. But even in the states that would choose popular election of the electors,
the choice of the people was meant to matter only to a very limited degree. The apparent
aim of the Electoral College was in fact to create a political body that would be elected
by the people, but independent from its will. The provision that the electors would meet
“in their respective States” was meant to isolate them from any external influences.
Whether those influences would come from “factious” minorities or foreign agents concerns about the possible intervention of European powers in a popular election of the
president had been repeatedly expressed throughout the proceedings of the Convention it was deemed unlikely that they could spread over the entire national territory, hence

26 RFC 2:512-13, 519.
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being determinant for the final outcome of the election. True, the electors could still
suffer from the excesses of localism. Hence the provision that the electors would “vote by
ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant o f the same State
with themselves.” This way the framers tried to assure that at least one of the candidates
from each state, even the one who got fewer votes, would have a national character.
Madison had already warned the Convention against the possibility that common voters
could “throw away” their second vote. Even though the electors of the president were
supposed to be more “informed,” to a certain extent Madison’s warning applied to them
too. In fact the delegates hoped that under the system they had engineered it would be
possible that the second-best man in all the states would be the president, or that, in case
o f a runoff election in the House, the choice could at least be made among notable
candidates.27
The Electoral College thus solved several problems, and though it certainly was a
sophisticated mechanism, its genius was its simplicity. Being an exact reproduction of
Congress, it perfectly reflected the Connecticut Compromise in the apportionment of
presidential electors among the several states, while at the same time securing the
president’s independence. With the introduction of the Electoral College, the framers
were also avoiding what they considered the practical as well as political shortcomings of
popular election. As a result, the Electoral College met with the almost unanimous
consent o f the framers. They added only minor amendments to the text the Committee
had submitted, before finally passing the whole provision on September 7. The

27 RFC 2:498. An illustration of the framers’ typical concerns about the possible intervention of European
powers in a popular election o f the president is in one of Madison’s intervention of July 25, RFC 2:109.

33

substitution of the House for the Senate, as the branch of Congress that would select the
president in case of a runoff election, was coupled by another amendment that further
secured the election from “the great evil of cabal,” as Morris put it. The words “the
election shall be on the same day throughout the United States” were thus added to the
provision that the electors “shall meet in their respective States.” This way, the framers
aimed at further isolating the electors from any external influence.
That the framers, with few exceptions, were satisfied with the final Electoral
College is also revealed by testimony other than the records o f the Philadelphia
Convention. In The Federalist Hamilton wrote that at the Convention “the mode of
appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States [had been] almost the only part
of the system, of any consequence, which [had] escaped without severe censure, or which
[had] received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.” Maybe Hamilton
overstated his memory for the sake o f political struggle. Maybe Abraham Baldwin did so
as well fifteen years later, on December 1803, during a session of the U.S. Senate that
was debating the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment. Baldwin had been one of
Georgia’s five delegates at Philadelphia and he recalled how the Convention welcomed
the proposal of the Electoral College: “The mode was perfectly novel, and therefore
occasioned a pause, but when explained and fully considered was universally admired,
and viewed as the most pleasing feature in the Constitution.” However there might be
some truth in both Hamilton and Baldwin’s reminiscences.

28 RFC 2:519, 500, 518. According to Slonim, the Electoral College was “a special congress elected to
choose a president, without the shortcomings of the real Congress.” Slonim, “Electoral College,” 52.
29 Publius, “The Federalist LXVIII,” New York Independent Journal, March 12, 1788, in DHRC, 16:376.
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The Electoral College was the answer to a complicated and long-debated set of
problems, and it was an ingenious mechanism indeed. No wonder, then, that the assembly
filled with a number of well-educated eighteenth-century rationalists was not only
surprised by that last-minute solution, but also impressed by such a masterpiece of
constitutional engineering.

RFC 3:403.

CHAPTER II
FEDERALISTS AND ANTI-FEDERALISTS DISCUSS THE PLAN

The proceedings o f the Philadelphia Convention were kept secret throughout the
almost four months the framers conceived and discussed the provisions of the new
constitution. On September 17 the Convention adjourned for the last time and forwarded
its report to the Continental Congress, recommending that the Constitution be sent to the
states to be ratified by appropriately elected conventions. On September 20 the
Continental Congress read the document and on the 28th, after a brief debate, it
transmitted the draft to the states. Over the next months the states called the conventions
for ratification while the Constitution started being discussed, supported, and criticized. It
had finally entered the public sphere.
The debate on the ratification of the Constitution involved many disparate voices
that dominated American politics at least until the Constitution was finally secured when
the New York Convention voted for its ratification in late July, 1788. The many
provisions of the proposed plan of government gave rise to a host of highly problematic
predictions about their alleged consequences. However, because of the relevance of the
changes in the federal government that the Constitution entailed as well as the extension
of popular participation in the ratification process, the nature of the debate became a
grand referendum on the state o f American politics after more than a decade of
revolutionary ferment. And while the contending arguments were national in character,
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within the borders of each state the outcome of ratification depended on many variables:
to what extent joining the Union was advantageous for the state, social conditions and
political partisanship, the degree of party organization, the relative openness of the press
and democratization of society, and the timing of the decision.
A variety of either wishful or worried predictions were thus expressed by an array
of notable personalities as well as obscure figures. An assortment of political languages
was displayed in both the private sphere and the public arena, including the chambers of
the state legislatures and conventions, where discussion was regulated by formal
procedures, the growing and less manageable world of the press, and the public meetings
of common citizens, where deferential habits could be easily put aside. Printed material
was particularly rich and diverse, including the learned essays o f The Federalist and The
Federal Farmer series as well as pieces of pure propaganda, satires, and parodies.
That the ratification of the Constitution gave rise to such a cacophony makes
historical interpretation harder but it is also a blessing. The records o f the debate provide
useful information for our understanding of the framers’ intentions, since most of them
actively participated in the struggle for ratification, dwelling on the feature of the new
plan of government and responding to several enquires about the reason why they had
approved certain provisions while striking others down.
But most of all, though the lack o f well-organized national parties does not allow
one to draw straight lines between those pro or against ratification, the records of the
debate still provide valuable evidence as to how the Constitution was understood,
supported, and opposed by Americans o f different culture and social status, and from
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different sections of the newborn nation.1
The major issues that informed the discussion at Philadelphia - federalism,
representation, the separation of powers and their balance in the federal government —
were now debated in a way that reflected the compound political culture of Revolutionary
America, while also mirroring sectional and interstate cleavages. Both the Federalists and
that heterogeneous coalition that we call the Anti-Federalists were enmeshed in the
contradictions of a traditional order strained by social tensions. And if the Federalists
more coherently championed a modem concept of political representation, whereas many
Anti-Federalists most likely were stuck to a chimerical idea of direct democracy, neither
those who supported nor those who either strenuously opposed or simply criticized the
Constitution were completely free from a traditional concept of government and society.
Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists often called for a paramount and elusive
common good, while at the same time advocating the legitimacy o f private interests.
The political meaning of the struggle between nationalism and parochialism was
complex in other ways too. By enlarging the size of electoral districts and extending
terms of office, the Constitution was meant to dilute the character of representation at the
federal level. National consolidation therefore entailed a conservative turn away from the

1For a general account of the ratification debate, see Robert A. Rutland, The Ordeal o f the Constitution:
The Antifederalist and the Ratification Struggle o f 1787-1788 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1966). For a discussion of the nature of the debate, see Rakove, Original Meanings, 15-18, 95-96, 130-142,
and “The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George Washington,” in Beeman and Botein, eds.,
Beyond Confederation, 290-293.
2 On the Federalists and Anti-Federalists’ political culture, see Wood, Creation; Rakove, Original
Meanings', Storing, What the Anti-Federalist Were For (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). On
the composed nature of the Anti-Federalist coalition, see Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: AntiFederalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1999).
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radicalism of the Revolution and promised to curb the democratic accomplishments as
well as populist excesses in many of the states. Commercial and financial interests as
well as the improvement of the market economy were also at stake. Creditors and
commercial-minded Americans were more likely to favor the adoption of the new
constitution than debtors and rural denizens who were on the periphery of the market
economy.3
Though with varying intensity, these lines of conflict cut across each state, both in
the North and the South. Basically, those cleavages ran along the blurring line that
separated the wealthier areas of ports and navigable streams from the poorer ones o f the
backcountry, the older and more urbanized Eastern regions from the less structured
settlements that spread toward the Western frontier. And if the late pre-Revolutionary
period witnessed a gradual democratization of the colonial governments, the Revolution
opened unprecedented possibilities in the states for the representation of these conflicting
interests, which were also intensified by the economic and financial distress that came
along with the struggle for independence.
As political consciousness and mutual support emerged among the lesser classes
who traditionally had been the ruled rather than the rulers, partisanship exacerbated and,
particularly in Massachusetts, New York, and most of all Pennsylvania, party politics
developed at the state level.

3 For the distinction between nationalists and parochialists see Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History
o f the United States during the Confederation, 1781-1789 (New York). Jensen interpreted the partisan
politics of the Congress as a contest between centralists and parochialists over the kind of powers to be
granted to the national governments. He viewed the parochialists as defenders of democratic
accomplishments in the states and the centralists as conservatives who tried to control social and economic
change through consolidation.
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A major feature of consolidation was also the regulation of sectional and interstate
relations. The thirteen states spread over a large area and formed a diverse coalition. '
Slavery constituted a major difference between Northern and Southern states, affecting
culture, politics, and social structure, as did the relative newness of settlements. The size
and geographical location of the states also mattered, particularly with regard to the
access to Western lands. Landed states like Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia had extensive western claims, which landless
states, led by Maryland, confronted. The situation in the West was also a matter of
common concern. Indians and European powers, the persistence of separatist movements,
and widespread defiance of state and federal officials by illegal settlers were a threat to
both the expansion and the defense o f the new nation as a whole. In the Continental
Congress landed and landless states reached a decisive compromise on the Northwest
Ordinance, which established Congress’s title to the western lands. The Ordinance was
adopted on July 13, 1787, only a few days before the Philadelphia Convention agreed
upon the Connecticut Compromise and the three-fifth clause. The Constitution, of which
the Connecticut Compromise and the three-fifth clause were two cornerstones, promised
to provide the foundation for national defense.4
The Ordinance and the Constitution virtually resolved the conflict between large
and small states, which would not be a critical issue during the struggle for ratification.
There was no serious debate in small states like Delaware, New Jersey, and Maryland,

4 On the importance of states’ size and geographical location in the debate on federalism see Rosemarie
Zagarri, The Politics o f Size: Representation in the United States, 1776-1850 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1987).
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nor in a weak state like Georgia, where the constant threat of Indian wars demanded
protection from Congress to allow westward expansion. That the Constitution protected
slavery and, at least until 1808, the slave trade was thus the main reason why Federalist
slaveholders, who ran the state’s economy and dominated the state’s government,
encountered limited opposition in South Carolina.
Yet the balance of power between the states and the federal government
embedded in the Constitution continued to be seen as a major problem by those who still
resisted consolidation and its effect on the states’ autonomy and, most of all, on the
political situation in many areas o f the Confederation. Opposition to the ratification of the
Constitution coalesced particularly in those landed and more populated states that had
strengthened their relative autonomy throughout the colonial period, and where social
turmoil and political partisanship had increased over the course of the Revolution. In
Pennsylvania ratification was influenced by the flush of enthusiasm that spread after the
signing of the Constitution. The Constitutional Party - the coalition of back-country
Scotch-Irish Presbyterian farmers and Philadelphia artisan-radicals that had created the
state’s constitution of 1776 and had run the state legislature for most of the Revolutionary
period - probably did not have enough time to organize into an effective opposition to the
conservative, former-loyalist, and now-Federalists Republicans. But in Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York, where ratification took much longer, the
Constitution was warmly debated and closely contested between two evenly balanced
parties. North Carolina and Rhode Island ratified the Constitution even later. Not
ratifying it would have confined the two states to a disadvantageous and perhaps
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dangerous isolation from the other eleven that had already entered the Union.5
Federalism, representation, and the separation and balance of powers had been
central to the framers’ definition of the national executive and its election. Those issues
informed the discussion o f the Electoral College during the ratification debate as well.
Many Anti-Federalists criticized Article II of the Constitution, the one that defines the
powers and election of the president. A major concern of virtually all Anti-Federalists
was the power of Congress to determine the time and place of the presidential election.
But their main objection was that the president had been given too much power and that
he could have even become a king, because his power would not be sufficiently checked.
Many thus criticized the length of the terms of office and its indefinite re-eligibility. And
if almost nobody objected to the provision o f a single executive, there were fears that the
president and the Senate, who share extended power of appointment and major
responsibility in foreign policy, would resemble the British king and privy council.
Proposals were thus made that an independent council of appointment be created.
Likewise those who criticized the Electoral College stressed the risk of a new monarchy
and the establishment of a truly aristocratic regime. Some complained about indirect
election that rendered the president, as Richard Henry Lee put it, “two removes from the
people.” Mercy Otis Warren defined the Electoral College as “an aristocratic junto, who
may easily combine in each State to place at the head of the Union the most convenient

5 For a general account o f the ratification in the several states, see primarily Patrick T. Conley and John P.
Kaminski, eds., The Constitution and the States: The Role o f the Original Thirteen in the Framing and
Adoption o f the Federal Constitution (Madison, Wis.: Madison House, 1988). But see also Michael Allen
Gillespie and Michael Lienesch, eds., Ratifying the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
cl 989); Steven R. Boyd, The Constitution in State Politics: From the Calling o f the Constitutional
Convention to the First Federal Elections (New York: Garland, 1990).
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instrument for despotic sway.” Others considered the possibility that elections would
invariably end up in Congress not only as a concession to the states but also as limitations
on the representation of the people.6
Conversely, those who during the early 1780s had been willing to strengthen the
continental government, were unhappy with the absence of an independent executive
under the Articles of Confederation. Though they were probably not prepared as were the
Federalists to concentrate so much authority in the hands of the president and though they
suspected the Federalists’ intentions, some Anti-Federalists nevertheless recognized the
need for a stronger executive office. Among them were influential Anti-Federalists like
the author o f the Letters from the Federal Farmer as well as prominent figures, such as
Virginia’s Patrick Henry and George Mason, New York’s Governor George Clinton, and
Massachusetts’s Elbridge Gerry. Gerry and Mason were two of the five delegates at the
Philadelphia Convention who at the last minute refused to sign the Constitution. Yet they
had mixed feelings about the Electoral College.
In fact finding a properly balanced system of presidential election, like the
framers had laboriously done over the course o f the Philadelphia Convention, was a
difficult task, one that often resulted in proposals that were hard to justify within the
given Constitutional framework. For example, one of the fourteen amendments
Massachusetts Anti-Federalist “Agrippa” proposed as a condition to the adoption of the
Constitution provided that “[t]he president shall be chosen annually and shall serve but
one year, and shall be chosen successively from the different states, changing every

6 Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph, October 16, 1787, DHRC 8:62. A Columbian Patriot,
“Observation on the Constitution,” Boston, February, 1788, DHRC 281
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year.” With this constitutional amendment Agrippa was providing a coherent alternative
to the Electoral College. The amendment, however, would have defeated the framers’
attempt to provide the president with the necessary dispatch, strength, and independence,
while probably voiding the office of any significance but that o f a politically irrelevant
administrator. The Federalists had thus good arguments to champion the framer’s work,
and that was particularly true with regard to the crucially important balance between
states’ right and the authority of the federal government that had been accomplished with
the creation of the Electoral College.7
That was one o f the main subjects of the speech that James Wilson - a major
advocate for the strengthening of the executive office at the Philadelphia Convention delivered in the State House Yard of Philadelphia, on October 6. Held less than three
weeks after the closing of the Convention, Wilson’s speech opened the Federalists’
campaign for ratification in Pennsylvania. Wilson’s argument that the Constitution made
the presidential election the domain o f the state legislatures was simple and effective:
“The president is to be chosen by electors, nominated in such manner as the legislature of
each state may direct,” he maintained, “so that if there is no legislature, there can be no
electors, and consequently the office of president cannot be supplied.” The speech was
immediately published and then widely reprinted at the national level. Wilson repeatedly
made his case about the federal character of the presidential elections in newspapers and
as a delegate at the Pennsylvania Convention. His straightforward argument represented
the Federalists’ typical understanding of federalism, and was particularly influential over

7 Agrippa XVI, Massachusetts Gazette, February 5, 1788, DHRC 5:866.
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the course of the ratification debate.8
In a letter where he explained the features of the new Constitution to Jefferson,
Madison, like Wilson, stressed that “[t]he general authority will be derived entirely from
the subordinate authorities,” and that the president “derives his appointment from the
States, and is periodically accountable to them.” Writing a few month later as “Publius”
in the New York Independent Journal, he likewise maintained that “[t]he State
Governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal
Government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation of the former. Without
the intervention of the State Legislatures, the President o f the United States cannot be
elected at all.”9
Later in the ratification process, the same argument echoed in a speech by
Federalist James Iredell at the North Carolina Convention. Noting that “[t]he very
existence of the general government depends on that of the State governments,” Iredell
argued that each branch of the federal government, including the presidency, depended
directly on the states. “The State legislatures are to choose the senators. Without a Senate
there can be no Congress. The State legislatures are also to direct the manner of choosing
the president. Unless, therefore, there are State legislatures to direct that manner, no
president can be chosen. The same observation may be made as to the House of
Representatives, since, as they are to be chosen by the Electors of the most numerous

8 James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard, Philadelphia, October 6, 1787, DHRC 2:170. According
to the editors of the DHRC, Wilson’s became “the ‘official’ Federalist interpretation o f the Constitution
throughout the United States.” DHRC 2:128.
9 James Iredell, Speech at the North Carolina Convention, July 25, 1788, in DSSC 3:53. For an articulate
statement o f the same argument by Wilson, see also his speech at the Pennsylvania Convention of
November 28, 1787, DHRC 2:401-404.
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branch of each State legislature, if there are no State legislatures, there are no persons to
choose the House o f Representatives.” 10
According to Federalist John Dickinson, who had been one of the authors of the
Connecticut Compromise at the Philadelphia Convention, the states had been given “the
fairest, freest opening” regarding the presidential election. But many Anti-Federalists did
not share the Federalists’ conception of federalism. Most Anti-Federalists criticized the
Federalists’ idea o f representation and sovereignty, which they evidently considered too
abstract, if not deceptive. Arthur Lee, an elite Anti-Federalist from New York writing as
“Cincinnatus,” rejected the idea that “[bjecause the state legislatures must nominate the
electors of the President once in four years... therefore they will continue to be
sovereign,” and that “[sovereignty then consists in electing the members of a
sovereignty.” Lee explicitly attacked Wilson: “Did you think, Sir, that you was [sic]
speaking to men or to children, when you hazarded such futile observations?” Similarly,
Samuel Bryan, the radical Anti-Federalist who authored the widely circulated and quite
influential essays known as “Centinel,” challenged Wilson’s argument that “the existence
o f the proposed federal plan depends on the existence of the State governments, as the
senators are to be appointed by the several legislatures, who are also to nominate the
electors who chuse the President of the United States; and that hence all fears of the
several States being melted down into one empire, are groundless and imaginary.” Bryan
asked: “Who is so dull, as not to comprehend, that the semblance and forms of an ancient
establishment, may remain after the reality is gone?” Rejecting what he considered

10 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787, DHRC 13:445. Publius, “The Federalist XLV,”
New York Independent Journal, January 26, 1788, DHRC 15:478.
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Wilson’s formalism, Bryan was concerned that the state legislatures would “dwindle into
mere boards of appointment.” A skeptical Samuel Osgood was likewise concerned about
Congress and their power “of making or altering the Times & Manner” of choosing the
presidential electors. “How far the Word ‘Manner’ extends I know not,” he confided to
Samuel Adams. But it was clear to him that the existence of the State Legislature was
“not necessary for the purpose of choosing Electors,” and that it was “not fit that a Board
o f Electors Should be called a Legislature.”11
Lee, Bryan, and Osgood’s remarks reflected the understandable uncertainties on
the actual functioning of the Electoral College, that sometimes gave rise to untenable
predictions about the possible encroachment o f the federal government on the state
governments. Though the Constitution reserved ample power to the state legislatures, in
most of the states Anti-Federalists o f any provenance were still afraid that Congress
would manage to exclude the state legislatures from the regulation of federal elections
and even curb the people’s right to vote. Robert Whitehill, a delegate at the Pennsylvania
Convention from Cumberland County, a western stronghold of Pennsylvania AntiFederalists, found it “improper” that Congress had the power to fix the time of choosing
the presidential electors. “We have no power to oblige Congress to act,” he maintained.
Massachusetts Anti-Federalist “Samuel” argued that Congress may make the president
“perpetual,” and that even the president may make himself so: “For the Congress are to
appoint the time, and place of choosing the electors, and of their giving their votes, the

11 Fabius II (John Dickinson), Pennsylvania Mercury, April 15, 1787, DHRC 17:124. Cincinnatus V, “To
James Wilson, Esquire,” New York Journal, November 29, 1787, DHRC 14:307. Centinel II, Philadelphia
Freeman’s Journal, October 24, 1787, DHRC 13:459. Centinel V, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer,
December 4, 1787, DHRC 14:347. Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams, January 5, 1788, DHRC 15:265-266.
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President may so far negative it, as that there must be two thirds of both Houses to make
it valid; and the standing army they may keep in time of peace, they may canton where
they please, to suppress any complaints that may arise by oppression, or loss of rights or
privileges.” Patrick Henry warned the Virginia Convention that the “controul given to
Congress over the time, place, and manner o f holding elections, will totally destroy the
end o f suffrage.” In New York “The Federal Farmer” was likewise concerned that
Congress would not make any provision for election and would eventually cancel them.

19

Even after their state had already ratified the Constitution, a group of
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists, including Whitehall, published “The Dissent of the
Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention.” Their grim prediction was that, “as Congress
have the control over the time of the appointment of the president general, o f the senators
and o f the representatives of the United States, they may prolong their existence in office,
for life, by postponing the time of their election and appointment, from period to period,
under various pretences, such as an apprehension of invasion, the factious disposition of
the people, or any other plausible pretence that the occasion may suggest... when the
spirit of the people shall be gradually broken; when the general government shall be
firmly established, and when a numerous standing army shall render opposition vain, the
Congress may compleat the system of despotism, in renouncing all dependence on the
people, by continuing themselves, and children in the government.” “A Georgian”
proposed a constitutional amendment to “fix the day unalterably forever for choosing

12 Samuel, Independent Chronicle, 10 January 1788, DHRC 5:680. Patrick Henry, Speech at the Virginia
Ratifying Convention, June 5, 1788, DHRC 9:964. Robert Whitehill, Speech at the Pennsylvania
Convention, December 7, 1787, DHRC 2:512. “Letter from the Federal Farmer XIV,” in CAF 2.8.181.
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Electors, and for them to give their votes for a President,” but he found little support for
the idea. However amendments providing for no federal interference into election laws,
unless a state failed to provide for election, were proposed by the conventions of
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York,
North Carolina, and Rhode Island. These amendments were similarly not adopted.

1^

Less controversial was the provision for the runoff election in Congress. That
concession to state righters derived, as Pennsylvania Federalists Tench Coxe put it, “from
a due attention to [the states’] sovereignty in appointing the ostensible head of the foederal
government.” Therefore most Anti-Federalist did not argue about it. Only the so-called
“Society of Western Gentlemen,” from Kentucky, proposed a constitutional amendment
providing that, in case o f a runoff election in the House, representatives would vote
“individually,” and that a quorum for that purpose would consist of “a Member or
Members from two thirds of the states.” The intention of the “Gentlemen” was perhaps
that of allowing Kentucky, at that time still a territory within the borders of Virginia, to
play an independent role in the election of the president. This proposal never received
serious discussion.14
The constitutional provision for the runoff election was nothing more than a

13 “The Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention,” Pennsylvania Packet, December 18,
1787, DHRC 15:23-24; A Georgian, Gazette of the State o f Georgia, November 15, 1787, DHRC 3:241.
For information about the proposed amendment, see Murray Dry, “The Case Against Ratification: AntiFederalist Constitutional Thought,” in Leonard Levy and Dennis Mahoney, eds., The Constitution: A
History o f its Framing and Ratification (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1987) p. 288.
14 A Freeman II, Pennsylvania Gazette, January 30, 1788, DHRC 15:510. “The Society o f Western
Gentlemen Revise the Constitution,” Virginia Independent Chronicle, April 30, 1788, DHRC 771, 777. The
“Western Gentlemen” were not the only ones in Kentucky 4o criticize the apportionment of representation
in the Electoral College and the provision for the runoff election in the House. Republicus warned his
readers that “the sacred rights of mankind” would “dwindle down to Electors of Electors, and those again
Electors of other Electors.” Republicus, Kentucky Gazette, March 1, 1788, DHRC 8:448.
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safety valve in case no candidate reached a majority in the Electoral College. That was
not likely to happen when one o f the candidates was a George Washington. But when the
celebrated general would no longer be politically active, a runoff election was still
considered, as Hamilton put in The Federalist, “a case which it cannot be doubted will
sometimes, if not frequently, happen.” That was part of the framers’ intention to regulate
the presidential election, in a way that guaranteed the federal character of the winning
candidate, while also securing the election from the reach of factious minorities. In other
words, the provision touched upon the major problems of partisanship and popular
representation in an extended republic. And those turned out to be the most divisive issue
not only between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, but also among Anti-Federalists, when
they discussed the Electoral College. The debate on the Electoral College in states such
as Pennsyilvania, Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York sheds light on the social and
political character of the struggle between Federalists and Anti-Federalists as well as the
composite nature of Anti-Federalism. In particular, it demonstrated the division that
existed among elite, middling, and plebeian Anti-Federalists, with respect to the critical
issues of partisanship and representation.15
Central to the Anti-Federalists’ conception of representation was the praise of the
virtues o f the small republic and the consequent rebuttal o f the Federalists’ plan of the
extended republic. As one historian noted with regard to the Anti-Federalist position,

15 Publius, “The Federalist LXVI,” New York Independent Journal, March 8, 1788, DHRC 16:356.
On the diversity o f the Anti-Federalist coalition, that reflected “inchoate class divisions in America,” and
their attempt to unite through the growing world o f print, that provided them with “a shared language and
common set of criticisms,” see Cornell, Other Founders, particularly Chapter I. Quotations are from pages
28,48.
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“[b]ehind the administrative defects of a large republic lie three fundamental
considerations, bearing on the kind of government needed in a free society. Only a small
republic can enjoy a voluntary attachment of the people to the government and a
voluntary obedience to the laws. Only a small republic can secure a genuine
responsibility of the government to the people. Only a small republic can form the kind of
citizens who will maintain republican government.” Yet the reasons why Anti-Federalists
advocated small size republics seem more complex. Elite Anti-Federalist, particularly
from small states, often considered the limited extent of a republic as a means of social
control, whereas in large states a republican government was likely to be strained by
internal social tension. It was probably with this in mind that Luther Martin, a Maryland
delegate to the Constitutional Convention and a leading Anti-Federalist in the Maryland
Ratifying Convention, told his fellow delegates at Philadelphia that “the States that please
to call themselves large, are the weakest in the Union.” Conversely, popular AntiFederalists, for example those from a large states like Pennsylvania, where partisanship
and popular participation had increased over the course of the Revolution, advocated
states’ rights in order to support popular representation, and feared that the establishment
of a strong federal government would curb the democratic tendencies in their states. A
plebeian Anti-Federalists from Pennsylvania, such as Centinel, embraced a class
conscious and radically localist ideology that was far from the aristocratic stance of elite
Anti-Federalists, such as Virginian Patrick Henry or Marylander Luther Martin.16

16 Storing, Anti-Federalists, 16. RFC 2:4. For Centinel’s constitutional thought, see in particular Centinel I,
Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, October 5, 1787, DHRC 1:159-165.
The consideration of the composite nature of the Anti-Federalists is necessary for a comprehensive
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In Pennsylvania the debate on ratification started right after the closing of the
Philadelphia Convention. On September 29 the Pennsylvania legislature called for a state
ratifying convention. With a few exceptions, Republicans were Federalists and
Constitutionalists were Anti-Federalists. From the outset of the debate, the Federalists
carefully stressed the “popular” character o f the presidential election. Tench Coxe, a
Federalist from the eastern county of Lancaster, championed the Electoral College in a
series of widely circulated essays, which he published under the pseudonyms of “An
American Citizen” and “A Democratic Federalist.” If Wilson, in his speech of October 6,
had stated that the presidential election was the domain of the state legislatures, Coxe
now maintained that the people were, under the proposed constitution, “the fountain o f
power and public honor” This applied to all branches of government, including the
presidency: “The President, the Senate, and House of Representatives, will be the
channels through which the stream will flow - but it will from the people, and from them
only. Eveiy office, religious, civil and military, will be either their immediate gift, or it

evaluation of their constitutional thought. Storing’s contention that Anti-Federalists saw “the chief danger
as the inherently aristocratic character o f any government” may be misleading, because there were
aristocrats sharing a traditional view of society in both coalitions. Likewise Wood’s idea that the quarrel
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists “was fundamentally one between aristocracy and democracy”
seems partial. Cornell’s perspective seems more balanced. To elite Anti-Federalists, Cornell maintained, “a
proper measure of democracy was necessaiy for rulers to enjoy the confidence o f the people,” and the
Constitution “threatened this distinctive vision of localism, because it would no longer be possible to
reconcile natural aristocracy with democracy.” On the other hand, “popular Anti-Federalism asserted the
superiority of democracy and vigorously defended egalitarian ideals.” Cornell’ pluralist perspective allows
one to grasp the diversity of Anti-Federalism and to go beyond Main’s more limited distinction between
“well-to-do thinkers, most frequently from the agricultural interests,” and “small property holder.”
According to Cornell, “[pjopular opposition to the Constitution brought together a diverse coalition that
included members o f the middling sort as well as plebeian farmers and artisan. The most influential
spokesmen for middling ideas were the new political men who dominated state politics in places like New
York and Pennsylvania.” Storing, Anti-Federalists, 48; Wood, Creation, 485; Cornell, Other Founders, 8082; Main, The Antifederalists: Critics o f the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1961), xi.
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will come from them through the hands of their servants”11
On the other fence of the political struggle, Centinel held a much different
concept of the presidency. In an inflamed essay in which he attacked the “wealthy and
ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow
creatures,” he rejected John Adams’s concept of mixed government as “chimerical,”
because “different orders in government will not produce the good of the whole,” and
dismissed the proposed plan of government as an “attempt to establish a despotic
aristocracy among freemen,” Centinel warned his readers against the cumulating powers
in the president and the Senate. The president, he contended, “would be a mere pageant
of state, unless he coincides with the views of the Senate, would either become the head
of the aristocratic junto in that body, or its minion.” And “from his power of granting
pardons, he might skreen [sic] from punishment the most treasonable attempts on
liberties o f the people.” An Old Whig considered the president as powerful as a king, but
what he found most dangerous was that the president would be a king “of the worst kind;
an elective King.” An Old Whig believed that an election for such a powerful office
would be “a scene of horror and confusion.” In fact he had the same concern that the
Federalists had about the political feasibility of the presidential election, but he did not
think the Electoral College to be the solution. According to An Old Whig, the office of
the president should have been “either reduced to a lower pitch or made perpetual and

17 An American Citizen IV, “On the Federal Government, Philadelphia,” October 21, 1787, DHRC 2:432
But see also An American Citizen I, “On the Federal Government,” Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer,
September 26, 1787, DHRC 2:142. An American Citizen II, “On the Federal Government,” Philadelphia
Independent Gazetteer, September 28, 1787, DHRC 2:143), and A Democratic Federalist, Independent
Gazetteer, November 16, 1787, DHRC 2:297.
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hereditary.”18
At the state convention that opened on November 20 Wilson was, again, an
eloquent advocate of the proposed constitution. He articulated the Federalists’ idea of the
president as a national figure above factious partisanship. He praised the provision o f the
presidential veto over Congress, as a measure “for the security and happiness of the
people o f the United States.” He believed that the president had to be a paternal figure,
and that the provision of the Electoral College served the purpose. The president, Wilson
contended, “will be chosen in such a manner that he may be justly styled THE MAN OF
THE PEOPLE; being elected by the different parts of the United States, he will consider
himself as not particularly interested for any one of them, but will watch over the whole
with paternal care and affection.” And if Centinel warned against the perils of
aristocracy, Wilson favored the Electoral College because “[ujnder this regulation, it will
not be easy to corrupt the electors, and there will be little time or opportunity for tumult
or intrigue.” The presidential election, he maintained, “will not be like the elections of a
Polish diet, begun in noise and ending in bloodshed.”19
After Pennsylvania had ratified the Constitution, Anti-Federalists continued to
campaign for amendments. The 23 delegates that had voted against ratification issued
“The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention o f Pennsylvania
To Their Constituents.” They did not share the Federalists’ conviction that the will of the
electorate would be refined and achieved through the creation of the Electoral College.

18 Centinel I, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, October 5, 1787, DHRC 1:159-165. An Old Whig VI,
Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, November 24, 1787, CAF 3.3.31.
19 James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Convention, December 1, 1787, DHRC 2:452; Speech at the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, December 11, 1787, DHRC 2:566-567.
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To the contrary, they were concerned that, under the new constitution, “men of the most
elevated rank in life, will alone be chosen,” and that “[t]he other orders in society, such as
farmers, traders, and mechanics, who all ought to have a competent number of their best
informed men in the legislature, will be totally unrepresented.” Philadelphiensis
published new warnings against the perils of an “elective king.” To this charge John
Dickinson responded: “This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large, because
it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the empire should always have the
necessary information, for directing the choice of such an officer; nor by Congress, lest it
should disturb the national councils; nor BY ANY ONE b o d y

w hatever,

for fear o f undue

influence.” What Dickinson meant by “undue influence” was mobocracy, because
“[w]hen frensy [sic] seizes the mass, it would be madness to think o f their happiness, that
is, of their freedom. They will infallibly have a Philip or a Ccesar, to bleed them into
soberness of mind.”
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Words like Dickinson’s resonated in the chamber of the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention, where Fisher Ames maintained that “ [fjaction and enthusiasm are the
instruments by which popular governments are destroyed.” Ames was a leading
Federalist and a member o f the so-called “Essex Junto,” an elitist group of propertied
conservatives from Essex County, in the Northern part of the state. To Ames, democracy
was “a volcano, which conceals the fiery materials o f its own destruction.” But William

20 “The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania To Their
Constituents,” Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, December 18, 1787, CAF 3.11.35.
Philadelphiensis XII, Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal, April 9, 1788, 17:62. But see also Philadelphiensis
IX, X, XI, DHRC 16:57-58, 159, 366. Fabius II, Pennsylvania Mercury, 15 April, 17:121. Fabius IV,
Pennsylvania Mercury, April 19, 1788, DHRC 17:182.
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Symmes, an elite Anti-Federalist also from Essex County, considered faction “the vehicle
of all transactions in publick bodies,” and claimed to be “rather surprised” to see that
other gentlemen that “know this so well” were “so sanguine in this respect.” Faction was
a controversial issue in a state that had long clung to the ideal of a cooperative society but
had been recently strained by the tension between commerce and community. To AntiFederalist Benjamin Austin, Jr., a leader of the Boston mob close to Samuel Adams, and
/

a delegate to the state convention, presidential electors could indeed be a faction. Writing
as “Candidus,” he contended that the “choice of President by a detached body of electors
was dangerous and tending to bribery.”

91

Virginia delegates that convened in their state convention between the 2nd and the
27th of June, 1788, were equally preoccupied with the influence of faction in the
presidential election. Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists Virginians expressed alleged
concerns about the problem of partisanship. Most Federalists probably agreed with
Francis Corbin, who found that the “evils” o f “faction, dissension, and consequent
subjection of the minority, to the caprice and arbitrary decisions of the majority, who
instead of consulting the interest of the whole community collectively, attend sometimes
to partial and local advantages,” would be “avoided by this Constitution.” Anti-Federalist
leaders thought the opposite. James Monroe did not trust Congress, for its power to fix
the time of choosing the presidential electors and the president. He asked the Convention:
“Is it not presumable they will appoint the times of choosing the Electors, and electing

21 Fisher Ames, Speech at the Massachusetts Convention, January 15, 1788, DHRC 6:1192. William
Symmes, Speech at the Massachusetts Convention, 22 January, 1788, DHRC 6:1309. Candidus I,
Independent Chronicle, December 6, 1787, DHRC 4:395.
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the president, at a considerable distance from each other, so as to give an opportunity to
the Electors to form a combination?” Monroe also predicted that a number o f presidential
electors might have prevented the election of a candidate they disliked, by throwing the
election into Congress. The president would have thus depended on a majority of the
states. And if that was the case, William Grayson glossed, “the seven Eastern States”
would take hold of the presidential election, so that the federal government would have
been a “government of a faction.” Apparently the issue of popular participation in the
presidential election did not concerned these elite Anti-Federalists, who focused instead
on the representation of the states.

99

A concern similar to Monroe’s was expressed by “The Federal Farmer,” who
probably was New York middling Anti-Federalist Melancton Smith. The Federal Farmer
was against “a feeble executive,” and admitted that the constitutional provision for the
presidential election was the result of “a judicious combination of principles and
precautions.” He found that, if the number of presidential electors were increased, “the
system would be improved,” yet he did not consider the democratic character “so
important in the choice of the electors as in the choice o f representatives,” because the
president will be anyway “one of the very few o f the most elevated characters.” But what
he found truly dangerous was “that a majority of a small number of electors may be
corrupted and influenced, after appointed electors, and before they give their votes,
especially if a considerable space of time elapse between the appointment and voting.”

22 Francis Corbin, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 6, 1788, DHRC 9:1010. James
Monroe, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 18, 1788, DHRC 10:1371. William Grayson,
Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 18, 1788, DHRC, 10:1374.
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On the other hand, Hamilton, who confronted Smith in the New York Ratifying
Convention and wrote probably the most cogent defense o f the Electoral College by a
Federalist, contended that the presidential election would be guarded against “cabal,
intrigue and corruption,” the “most deadly adversaries of republican government.”
Hamilton’s take on the problem of faction, while judicious, was less nuanced than the one
Madison had expressed a few months before in “The Federalist X.”23
Rhetorical skirmishes were not absent in the discussion about faction among
Federalists and Anti-Federalists: each side tended to ascribe factious motives to the other,
for the sake of their own position. But the problem of faction, partisanship, and party
politics remained controversial throughout the debate on ratification. True, a Federalist
like Madison was beginning to articulate a modem, pluralist concept o f party-politics,
while an Anti-Federalist like Symmes stated what was probably clear to many, when he
referred to the inevitability of factions as “the vehicle o f all transactions in publick
bodies.” Yet both coalitions were for the most part composed by men who, as one
historian put it, “looked upon parties as sores on the body public.” If most Federalists still
held a classical concept o f society, which was organic, hierarchical, and genuinely elitist
in its character, many Anti-Federalists pursued the equally traditional concept of the
small, homogeneous, and participatory community of yeoman farmers. Party politics had
gradually developed throughout the late colonial and revolutionary periods at both state

23 The Federal Farmer, “An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican,” New York, May 2, 1788,
DHRC 17: 325, 327. Publius, “The Federalist LXVIII,” New York Independent Journal, March 12, 1788,
DHRC 16:377. The identity of “The Federal Farmer” has long been controversial, and it is still not certain.
However I found Cornell’s contention that The Federal Farmer was Melancton Smith convincing. See
Cornell, Other Founders, 89.
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and national level, and the debate on the ratification of the Constitution further promoted
political polarization. In the decade immediately following the ratification of the
Constitution, a still inchoate party system rapidly articulated, hence changing the nature
of presidential elections, which became intensely politicized. The beginnings o f this
politicization were already apparent in the first federal elections of 1788-1790.24

24 The historian cited is Richard Hofstadter. The quotation is from Richard Hofstadter, The Idea o f a Party
System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States 1780-1840 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1969), 2.

CHAPTER III
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS

None o f the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights fundamentally altered either the
structure o f the federal government or the regulation of the federal elections. The
carefully crafted mechanism of the presidential election, with its many implications with
regard to federalism, representation, and the separation o f power, was probably the
constitutional provision least likely to be altered. Madison was right when he reminded
his fellow delegates of the Virginia Ratifying Convention that “[i]t was found difficult in
the Convention, and will be found so by any Gentleman who will take the liberty of
delineating a mode of electing the President that would exclude those inconveniences
which they apprehend.” During the ratification debate the Federalists’ plan for the
presidential election was never seriously challenged. The Anti-Federalists who criticized
it were often unable to provide any viable alternative.1

1 James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 18, 1788, DHRC 10:1377. According
to Main, while the office of the president came under attack, “the major criticism was not directed at the
mode of his election nor his term of office. Less than a dozen of Antifederalists writers registered a protest
against the Electoral ... the vast majority of critics did not even mention the subject. Probably this was so
because no substitute seemed any more acceptable. Direct election would be a national rather than a federal
feature (as was understood in the Philadelphia Convention), while election by the legislature was no more
democratic than by the Electoral College.” Main, Antifederalists, 140. The validity o f Main’s observation
could be indirectly suggested by a remark by Wilson about Anti-Federalist critiques of presidential indirect
election. In a speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention Wilson asked his opponents: “if gentlemen
object that an eighth part of our country forms a district too large for election, how much more would they
object, if it was extended to the whole Union?” James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention, 11 December 1787, DHRC 2:567. However there is no evidence that the Anti-Federalist
opposed popular election for its federal character.
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Still, the actual functioning o f the Electoral College was, at least in part,
indefinite, to the extent that nobody knew for certain what system each state legislature
would choose for the selection of the presidential electors. Federalist Tench Coxe praised
the Electoral College, since the “[t]he people at large in each state... may choose the
electors of the President and Vice-President of the Union.” But he had to add: “unless
ordered otherwise by the state legislatures.” The debate on the presidential election
therefore continued as the state legislatures had to decide on how to select the presidential
electors. In the pages of the “Massachusetts Centinel” an anonymous Anti-Federalist
advocated the popular election of the presidential electors and attempted a first
interpretation of the framer’s original intent. He opposed the election by the State
legislature because, if that were the case, “there would be much time given for making an
interest among the members, whereas no such interest could be made among Electors, as
it is impossible to foresee who the people are to choose.” He concluded that this seemed
to be “the object of the Constitution, in directing that all the Electors shall sit on the same
day, so as to make it impossible for any communications of runners between.” The
General Court of Massachusetts only partially fulfilled his claim, providing for a direct
popular election by district, followed by a runoff election in the state legislature between
the first two candidates from each district. Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and
Virginia choose direct popular election instead, while New Jersey and Georgia opted for
the election by their state legislatures. North Carolina and Rhode Island, who still had not
ratified the Constitution, did not participate in the first presidential election. Neither did
New York, whose state legislature did not come to an agreement on the method of
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election of the presidential electors.
The case of New York sheds light on a critical aspect of the first presidential
election. In New York the ratification debate sharpened party lines between the opposing
coalitions that had formed after the split of the state’s independence coalition. As in the
colonial era sharp partisan divisions characterized New York’s politics in the 1780s.
These cleavages reflected conflicting social and economic interests. The Federalists
represented the landed interests from the more established and wealthier urban and
commercial southern counties, and were the heirs of the great families of Dutch
aristocrats, who had dominated the state’s politics prior to the Revolution. The AntiFederalists came from the ranks of the coalition of popular Whigs that had formed during
the Revolution. Largely representative of the farmers from the northern counties and the
rising bourgeoisie of the south, the Anti-Federalists were united under the leadership of
Governor George Clinton. In the state’s ratifying convention forty-six delegates were
Anti-Federalists, and only nineteen were Federalists. But not all Anti-Federalists opposed
ratification. Many of them were dissatisfied with the Articles of Confederation and,
particularly after Virginia ratified on July 2, 1788, they merely conditioned ratification on
the introduction of constitutional amendments. The New York Convention finally ratified
the Constitution on July 26, by a close vote of thirty to twenty-seven, but on the same day
the Convention issued a circular letter which called for a second constitutional
convention. Political turmoil continued as the Anti-Federalists started campaigning for
constitutional amendments. Intense partisanship characterized the proceedings o f the new

2 An American Citizen IV, “On the Federal Government,” Philadelphia, 21 October, 1787, DHRC, 13:436;
Massachusetts Centinel, October 1, 1788, DHFFE 1:465.
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legislative assembly that began in December, with the Federalists controlling the Senate
and the Anti-Federalists dominating the House. For almost two months the Senate and the
House were unable to reach a compromise on the election of the presidential electors. On
February 4, the date specified by Congress for the meeting of the Electoral College, the
Senate refused to compromise on a bill for the appointment of the electors.
New York’s failure to participate in the first presidential election could probably
be explained with the Federalists’ success in frustrating Clinton’s ambition to win the
vice-presidency. Clinton maneuvered to secure the vice-presidency, so that he would be
in a favorable position for promoting constitutional amendments. He could count on a
wide support in his state and, with the help of his allies in Virginia, he hoped to rival John
Adams, the Federalists’ favorite candidate for the office. Melancton Smith, with Clinton
and Abraham Yates the leader o f New York Anti-Federalists, deemed it “very probable”
that his state and Virginia “would agree in the person for vice President - and by their
union might very probably determine the choice.” Smith was therefore willing to strike a
compromise on the election of New York presidential electors, and on January 10 he told
a friend that he was “of the opinion that the Legislature may yet choose.” But the
Federalists did not need New York’s votes to secure Washington’s election to the
presidency, and found it convenient to allow the deadlock. As early as December 30, the
strategy of New York and Virginia Anti-Federalists for winning the vice-presidency was
clear also to Federalist Edward Carrington, who came second in Virginia’s first district
for the election of presidential electors. Carrington informed Henry Knox that Patrick
Henry was making “a push to get electors appointed who shall vote for his Friend
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Clinton, as vice President,” and that it was “not unlikely that some votes for [Clinton]
will come from this State & South Carolina.” Carrington continued that it was possible
that he would be a presidential elector, and that he had been informed that Knox too
could be appointed elector. Since he believed that it became “necessary for the Friends of
the Government not to divide their votes too much,” Carrington asked Knox “some
information upon this point, as it will stand in your quarter.” The next day the
Pennsylvania Gazette, a Philadelphia paper close to the Federalists, announced the
candidacy of John Adams as vice-president, and warned its readers that “[n]othing but an
union in the choice of Mr. Adams can exclude Governor Clinton from the VicePresident’s chair.”
Smith, Hamilton, and Carrington’s words were not seemingly inconsistent with
the alleged spirit o f the presidential election. With the creation of the Electoral College,
the framers apparently had wanted to confine the presidential electors to a sort of political
limbo: the electors must operate in splendid independence from external influences, and
would go back to their private lives once they elected the president. Indirect election was
thus intended to provide that “filtration of talent” that only could foster
“cosmopolitanism” against “localism.” It would therefore secure the national government
into the hands of what John Adams called the “natural aristocracy,” a selected body of
disinterested citizens. Perhaps one could borrow from Madison’s definition of
representation in a republican government, and note that the Electoral College was

J Melancton Smith to John Smith, New York, January 10, 1789, DHFFE 3:315; Alexander Hamilton to
Theodore Sedgwick, New York, January 29, 1789, DHFFE 3:369; Edward Carrington to Henry Knox,
Richmond, December 30, 1788, DHFFE, 2:385-386; Pennsylvania Gazette, 31 December, 1788, DHFFE
1:122.
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conceived “to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium
o f a chosen body o f citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations.” Given the political environment of late eighteenthcentury America, Madison was in fact advocating for a system of “virtual” rather than
“actual” representation. The framers did not expect that such “refinement” would always
work in the selection of the president, hence the provision for a runoff election in the
House o f Representatives, but they did trust the presidential electors more than common
voters, because of the “virtuality” o f indirect election.4
Yet the framers could not rely exclusively on the presidential electors’ status to
obtain what they considered a sound method of selection. Although Washington’s
election to the presidency was virtually certain, the election of the vice-president was
more problematic. In those states where presidential electors were chosen by the state
legislature, local parties with increasingly strong ties to other states might make the
choice. And even in those states where the Electoral College worked as an indirect
popular election, electioneering was, particularly with regard to the vice-presidency,
influenced by the rapidly developing national coalitions. The latter were not yet the
organized Federalist and Republican parties of the 1790s, but they were nevertheless vital
in influencing the election. For example, in preparing for the 1789 elections,

4 Publius, “The Federalist X,” New York Daily Advertiser, November 22, 1787, DHRC 14:178. For the
concepts o f “filtration of talent” and “extended sphere of government,” see Wood, Creation, chapter XII,
but also Rakove, Original Meanings, chapter VIII. For Adams’ concept of “natural aristocracy,” see his A
Defence o f the Constitutions of Government o f the United States o f America (Union, N.J.: The Lawbook
Exchange, 2001). On the idea of the citizen’s disinterestedness, see Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness
in the Making of the Constitution,” in Beeman and Botein, eds., Beyond Confederation, 109.
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Pennsylvania Federalists and Anti-Federalists held apposite conventions to select their
candidates to the Electoral College. Furthermore, as Maryland Federalist William
Tilghman told Tench Coxe, the Constitution was “defective, in not obliging the Electors
to vote for a President & vice president, distinctly.” If the electors intended to concentrate
their votes on two candidates, one as president and the other as his vice-president, it was
conceivable that might mismanage their vote and elect the wrong person to the
Presidency. The problem was solved in 1804, with the introduction o f the twelfth
amendment, that helped parties to organize around a national ticket for both the president
and the vice-president. But in the first presidential election Tilghman, who was one of
Maryland presidential electors, still had to ask Coxe who was “talked of to the Northward
as Vice President.”5
The election o f John Adams as vice-president therefore entailed the intrusion of
party politics in the pristine isolation of the Electoral College. And it soon became
apparent that, despite the provisions of the Electoral College, some sort of national
coordination was needed to facilitate the popular election of the presidential electors. In
the first federal elections the Electoral College worked as a substitute for party
organization on the national scale. Thus, it is perhaps ironic that the Electoral College,
which was allegedly meant to prevent the influence of parties over the presidential
election, was in fact one of the means by which national parties first began to organize in
the United States.

5 William Tilghman to Tench Coxe, Chestertown, January 2, 1789, DHFFE 2:180.

CONCLUSION

The Electoral College nicely fitted the constitutional framework designed by the
framers. With the creation of the Electoral College, the framers preserved both the
separation of powers and state’s rights, two major features of the compromise reached at
Philadelphia. While avoiding what they considered its practical and political
shortcomings, the framers also upheld the principle of popular election o f the national
executive. The Electoral College can therefore be considered as one of the means by
which the framers were able to make the constitutional machine work and stabilize the
federal government at its very inception.
Shlomo Slonim, who has written probably the most accurate account o f the
framing of the Electoral College, maintained that the framers were primarily concerned
with issues such as “separation of powers, limited terms of office, reeligibility, rotation in
office, and devices for minimizing electoral corruption,” and most of all they needed “to
resolve the central dispute at Philadelphia, namely the large state-small state
controversy.”1
This is also how contemporary supporters of the Electoral College view its
creation at Philadelphia. They underline the enduring importance of the Electoral College
for the protection of federalism and representative democracy within the constitutional

1 Slonim, “Electoral College,” 57-58.
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framework, and praise the framers for having established the foundation of today’s
electoral system.
Something is nevertheless missing from this interpretation. It is apparent that the
framers held a concept of representation that was more traditional than modem, and that
the Electoral College was the constitutional provision that best embodied that concept.
Given the political and technological environment of the time, that was probably the only
form of representation that made a presidential election possible. Yet the formation,
through the Constitution, of a more aristocratic national elite was precisely one of the
framers’ primary objectives. This has been the classic argument of those Progressive and
neo-Progressive historians who have understood the Constitution as a Thermidorean
reaction and have maintained that the Electoral College was originally devised to keep
the common people from choosing the president.
Slonim has rejected the claim of the Progressive historians, maintaining that
“antimajoritarianism was by no means the primary motivation behind the creation of the
Electoral College.” Instead he argued that “ [o]nly a few delegates were opposed in
principle to direct election of the executive,” and that their opposition reflected “not

2 Other account o f the framing of the Electoral College are in Lucius Wildemerding, Jr., The Electoral
College (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958); John P. Roche, “The Founding Fathers: A
Reform Caucus in Action,” American Political Science Review 55 (Dec., 1961), 799-816; Neal R. Peirce,
The People’s President: The Electoral College in American History and the Direct-Vote Alternative (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1968); Tadahisa Kuroda, The Origins of the Twelfth Amendment: The Electoral
College in the Early Republic, 1787-1804 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1994). For the interpretation by
contemporary supporters of the Electoral College Cfr. Judith A. Best, The choice o f the people? Debating
the electoral college (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Gary L. Gregg II, “The Origins and Meaning
o f the Electoral College,” in Gregg, ed., Securing Democracy: Why We Have an Electoral College
(Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2001), 34; Robert M. Hardaway, The Electoral College and the
Constitution: The Case for Preserving Federalism (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994).
3 Cfr. J. Allen Smith, The Spirit o f American Government (New York: Macmillian, 1907); Charles A.
Beard, An economic interpretation of the constitution (New York: Free Press, 1941); Merril Jensen, The
making o f the American constitution (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964).
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mistrust of representative democracy, but a conviction that the extent o f the country and
the difficulty o f communication did not permit informed selection of a national
candidate.” Slonim’s argument reflects that of the majority of historians who have dealt
with the subject.4
Slonim effectively illustrated the genius of the Electoral College in solving an
array of constitutional questions regarding the election of the chief executive. Slonim’s
dismissal of antimajoritarianism and indeed of partisan objectives on the part of the
framers, however, seems not convincing. This becomes apparent if one does not stop at
considering the records o f the Constitutional Convention but proceeds on to examining
the ratification debate and, most of all, the actual proceedings of the first federal
elections. The latter, in particular, allows one to look beyond the Republican rhetoric that
clothed the arguments of the framers as well as those of the Federalists and their
opponents, and to appreciate the extent to which partisanship was instrumental to the
actual practice of electioneering.
The first federal elections were a Federalist triumph and Washington’s rise to the
presidency was never in doubt. Had the framers chosen a system different from the
Electoral College, the result of the presidential election would have most likely been the
same. It is not clear, however, who might have been elected as vice-president,
particularly in a direct popular election that would have probably dispersed the people’s

4 Slonim, “Electoral College,” 57-58. For similar account of the framing of the Electoral College, see
Lucius Wildemerding, Jr., The Electoral College (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958);
John P. Roche, “The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action,” American Political Science Review
55 (Dec., 1961), 799-816; NealR. Peirce, The People’s President: The Electoral College in American
History and the Direct-Vote Alternative (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968); Tadahisa Kuroda, The
Origins of the Twelfth Amendment: The Electoral College in the Early Republic, 1787-1804 (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood, 1994).
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votes while increasing partisanship in areas already in turmoil, such as western
Massachusetts and North Carolina’s backcountry. Perhaps, had the election been direct,
the candidacy of the Federalist John Adams to the vice-presidency would have
encountered more resistance that it did. Clinton, an Anti-Federalist and a popular figure
at the time, might have taken advantage of a direct election better than Adams.
Furthermore, with no constitutional provision for separate ballots for president
and vice-president, like the one introduced in 1804 with the twelfth amendment, there
existed the possibility that the Federalists would inadvertently cast less ballots for
Washington than for his running mate. There is evidence that party discipline worked
among presidential electors as the Federalist leadership influenced the vote in the
Electoral College to keep such a scenario from taking place. Arguably it would have been
more difficult for the Federalist leadership to direct the common voters instead of
presidential electors, had the common voters been the ones to cast the ballot to elect the
president and the vice-president. By establishing a mechanism of indirect election of both
the president and the vice-president, the framers favored the exercise o f patronage and
promoted political organization on a continental scale. They therefore helped the betterconnected Federalists not only to secure Washington’s election from the unexpected
liabilities of the electoral system, but also to ensure the success of Adams’s candidacy to
the vice-presidency.
The framers allegedly hoped to place the presidential election process above
partisanship. From their firm condemnation of party politics, they seemingly believed
that presidential elections could operate in an unrealistic political vacuum. Carl Becker
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once noted: “If the motives of the founding fathers in devising [the Electoral College]
were of the highest, it must be said that their grasp of political realities, ordinarily so sure,
failed them in this instance.” The Electoral College, Becker concluded, “was in the nature
of an academic invention which ignored experience in the vain expectation that, in this
one instance for this high purpose, politicians would cease to be politicians, would divest
themselves of party prejudice and class and sectional bias, and be all for the time being
noble Brutuses inspired solely by pure love o f liberty and the public good.” Historians
have long agreed that the framers could not have predicted the emergence of national
parties that in the 1790s came to dominate American politics. In The Idea o f a Party
System: The Rise o f Legitimate Opposition in the United States 1780-1840, Richard
Hofstadter provided the classic statement of this standard interpretation. But if the
framers could not have apprehended how quickly the presidential election would become
a highly politicized contest, this does not mean that they really meant to keep the
presidential election out of the domain of politics and that they were ready to give up
control of the political process. The motives of the framers, and those of the Federalists
who echoed the framers’ anti-party rhetoric in the ratification debate, were not
necessarily “o f the highest.”5
In the ratification debate and the first federal election, particularly with regard to
the election of the vice-president, party politics played a role that went beyond what the
framers had predicted at Philadelphia. But those Federalists and Anti-Federalists who
spoke against the evils of partisanship, including many o f the former delegates at the

5 Carl Becker, “The Will of the People,” Yale Review, March 1945, 389. Hofstadter, Idea o f a Party System,
cit..
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Philadelphia Convention, actively campaigned for electors they trusted and sought to
organize the Electoral College to avoid the unintended shortcomings o f the simultaneous
election o f both the president and the vice-president. Thus, in the first federal election the
Electoral College worked as a substitute for the electoral machine that each party would
soon build into national coalitions. Not for the first time did the rhetoric of virtue give
way to the reality of politics.
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